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I. Introduction
American elections produce winners and losers. The distinction
between the two has traditionally been made by the voters. In
Pennsylvania's recent state senate special election, however, there was a
departure from this time-honored democratic practice. The winner of that
election was chosen by a federal district court judge.' Thus, despite our
nation's high regard for the will of the electorate, his vote became the
only vote that mattered.
The purpose of this paper is to summarize and examine the
dynamics of this special election and the events that led to the
involvement of the federal judiciary. The activities of the federal court
in this case will be examined within the framework of the public law
litigation model. This paper suggests that defining the Pennsylvania
election in terms of the public law litigation model offers some
explanation for the federal judges' activist behavior in this case.
However, this paper further posits that our inquiry should extend
beyond mere acceptance of the public law model as a given. Specifically,
the appropriateness of the federal judiciary's intervention into state
matters as well as the propriety of the remedies granted by the federal
district court in this case need to be explored. Only after looking closely
at these issues can we really begin to assess who the winners and losers
in this "special" election are.
II. Background: Pennsylvania's "Special" Senatorial Election
A. Vacancy in Senate
The death of Pennsylvania Senator Francis Lynch, a Democrat from
Philadelphia, created a vacancy in the Pennsylvania Senate prompting a
special election on November 2, 1993 to fill the position.2 Both
Republican Bruce S. Marks and Democrat William Stinson ran for the
seat.3  This election was particularly important since the result
established either Democratic or Republican control of the senate.'
I. See Marks v. Stinson, No. CIV. A. 93-6157, 1994 WL 146113, at *35 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26,
1994).
2. Russell E. Eshleman Jr., Senate Republicans Propose Election Law Changes-The
Legislation Comes After the Second District Mess and Last Year's Special Election in Bucks County,
PHILA. INQ., Jan. 26, 1994, at B5.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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B. Campaign Trail
During the election, though both candidates garnered much support,
Marks ran slightly ahead of Stinson according to a pre-election poll.5 To
remedy this, the Stinson Campaign began innovative tactics to gain
voters' support in predominantly white areas of town.6 They also
initiated an absentee ballot campaign targeting Hispanics and Blacks in
Philadelphia.7 Stinson supporters, some reading from "scripts" prepared
by the Stinson Campaign, contacted voters and explained that using
absentee ballots was the "new way" to vote.8 As such, many persons
relied upon the information provided, accepted ballots from campaign
workers, and wrongfully completed absentee ballots.9
C. State Level (in)Action
In order to prevent the illegally cast ballots from being counted,
Marks went to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on
November 1, 1993, seeking a temporary restraining order to impound all
absentee ballots.' The following day, Election Day, Marks was
permitted to present his complaint before Judge Maier of the County
Court of Common Pleas." Judge Maier retained jurisdiction of the case
but refused to hear any evidence of fraud. 2 On November 3, 1993
Maier began to consider Marks' absentee ballot challenges under section
3146.8(e) of Pennsylvania election law. 3 With a limited amount of
evidence presented, Judge Maier found that only eleven of Marks'
absentee ballot challenges were appropriate. 4 Therefore, the rest of the
absentee ballots were allowed to be counted by the Philadelphia County
Board of Elections (hereinafter "Board of Elections" or "Board").
5
On November 10, 1993, Marks filed an emergency petition with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to stay any further proceedings in the




9. Id.; see also Mark Duvosin et al., Improper Ballots Turned Election-A Review Indicates
540 Were Tainted, PHIIA. INQ., Mar. 25, 1994 at Al (describing the extent to which the Stinson
Campaign misled voters).
10. Marks, 19 F.3d at 879.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3146.8(e) (1994) (requiring that the county boards
of elections hear initial absentee ballot challenges).
14. Marks, 19 F.3d at 879.
15. Id.
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election. 6  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Marks' stay
motion on November 13 and four days later ruled that Judge Maier had
lacked jurisdiction over the initial section 3146.8(e) proceeding. 7  As
such, the matter was remanded to the Board of Elections for proper
consideration of the absentee ballot challenges."
The Board of Elections convened on November 18, 1993 to
consider Marks' absentee ballot challenge, 9 but refused to allow Marks
to introduce evidence of fraud.2" Testimony was limited to that of
actual pollwatchers.2 Since there were no pollwatchers present at the
hearing, however, the Board rejected all 551 absentee voter challenges
and almost immediately certified Stinson as winner of the election.22
This early instant certification was somewhat irregular since Stinson was
the only winning candidate who was certified on November 18.23 All
other winners were certified on November 22, 1993.24 Furthermore, the
Board certified Stinson although, statutorily, Marks had two days to
appeal its ballot decision.25 Marks had every intention of doing so and
contended that the Board knew, but ignored, his intentions. 26
Marks again went to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court-this time to
request a stay to prevent Stinson from voting on any bills when the
senate session reconvened. 27  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused
to grant Marks' stay.2 Thus, the certified results of the election showed
that Marks lost by 461 votes. On November 22, 1993, the Pennsylvania
Senate approved and certified Stinson by a 25-24 vote.29
16. Id.
17. Id. at 880.








26. Id.; see also Brief of Appellee-Bruce Marks at 11, Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir.
1994) (explaining that Stinson was waiting in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania during this proceeding and
was sworn into office within an hour of the decision).
27. Marks, 19 F.3d at 880. Note that the Pennsylvania Senate reconvened after a five month
recess initiated by Democrats who wanted to insure that they maintained a majority in the senate.
Robert Zausner & Wanda Motley, Republicans Try To Hold Back Stinson-It Was A Nasty Reunion
in the Senate, PHILA. INQ., Nov. 23, 1993, at Al.
28. Marks, 19 F.3d at 880.
29. Id.; see also 1994 WL 146113, at *2 (recounting that Marks received 19,691 machine votes
and 371 absentee votes while Stinson received 19,127 machine votes and 1,396 absentee votes).
Senator Robert Jubelier, Republican, objected to the fact that Stinson was permitted to vote as a
member of the senate. Marks, 19 F.3d at 880. Because of this and other questionable acts taken by
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A frustrated Marks sought further relief on November 19, 1993 by
appealing the Board's decision to the Philadelphia County Court of
Common Pleas.3" Marks and the Republican State Committee again
tried to introduce evidence of fraud. 3' However, Judge Mark I.
Bernstein said that he could not hear any new evidence and could only
review the Board's decision based on the evidence presented below.32
As such, on December 14 Bernstein was forced to affirm the Board's
decision that the absentee ballots were proper.33
Meanwhile, disgruntled voters from the second senatorial district
separately filed an election contest pursuant to section 3401 of
Pennsylvania election law in the Philadelphia County Court of Common
Pleas on November 18, 1993. 34 On January 10, 1994 Judge Bernstein
ruled on their election claim as well. Judge Bernstein found that by
law the voters needed to post a bond of $50,000 before they could pursue
their cause of action.36 Since the voters were unable to raise the money,
their claim was dismissed without a hearing on the merits.37
Marks and the Republican State Committee appealed Judge
Bernstein's December 14, 1993 decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.38 Marks also appealed the election contest to the Pennsylvania
State Senate.39
III. Federal Courts Take Charge
A. Enter Judge Clarence Newcomer
Feeling hopeless in the state court system, Marks, the voters who
had earlier filed suit in state court, and a new group of Latino voters took
the Democratic members of the senate, Jubelier filed a lawsuit. See Jubelier v. Singel, 638 A.2d 352
(Pa. Commw. 1994) (finding that the state senate was permitted to certify Stinson, a Democrat,
before a Republican senator elected several months earlier).
30. Marks, 19 F.3d at 880.
31. Id at 881.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Marks, 19 F.3d at 880. See also PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3401 (1963) (granting the courts
of common pleas jurisdiction to hear election contests).
35. Marks, 19 F.3d at 881.
36. Id.; see also PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3459 (1994) (requiring petitioners in an election
contest to post a bond in a sum that the court "shall designate").
37. Marks, 19 F.3d at 881.
38. Id.
39. Id; see also PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3407 (1963) (providing that a candidate who runs in
a General Assembly election may, if aggrieved by a decision of the courts, appeal his election contest
to the House for which he ran).
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action in federal court to prevent Stinson from acting as senator.4 ° In
late December 1993 Marks filed a first amended complaint with the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(hereinafter "district court"). 4' This complaint alleged that Stinson and
those involved in the fraud violated the First Amendment of the
Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution' the Voting
Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. section 1983 by misleading the minority voters
and knowingly counting wrongly cast ballots.
42
After deciding jurisdiction was proper and following a three day
trial, the district court rendered a decision on the plaintiffs' claims. 43 In
his February 18, 1994 decision, Judge Clarence Newcomer found that
Stinson had indeed perpetrated "a massive scheme" upon the voters.44
He further found that the Board of Elections obstructed justice since it
essentially prevented Marks' and the voters' claims from being heard. 5
Newcomer granted Marks' requested relief by enjoining William Stinson
from acting as state senator.46 In his order, Judge Clarence Newcomer
decreed that future absentee ballots be written in English and in Spanish,
that the Board of Elections be enjoined from distributing absentee ballots
to candidates or their agents in a discriminatory manner and that the
Board be prohibited from collecting completed absentee ballots from any
campaign workers.47  The district court then took the unusually bold
step of ordering the Board of Elections to nullify all absentee ballots, and
to certify Bruce Marks as the winner of the election based only upon
votes cast in the voting machines.4'
B. Third Circuit Review
Stinson and the other defendants appealed to the United States Third
Circuit Court of Appeals (hereinafter "Third Circuit" or "appellate
court").49 The appellate court examined whether or not the federal
judiciary had a duty to abstain from hearing the case given the pending
actions in the state supreme court and the state senate."0 The Third
40. Brief of Appellee-Bruce Marks at 13.
41. Id.; see also Marks v. Stinson, No. CIV.A. 93-6157, 1994 WL 37722, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
7, 1994).
42. 1994 WL 37722 at *1.
43. Marks v. Stinson, No. CIV.A. 93-6157, 1994 WL 47710 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994).
44. Id. at *14.
45. Id. at *10.
46. Id. at *16.
47. Marks, 1994 WL 47710, at *16.
48. Id
49. Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1994).
50. Id. at 881-885.
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Circuit issued its decision on March 16, 1994, holding that federal court
was an appropriate forum and upholding the ousting of Stinson."
However, the Third Circuit found Newcomer's bold move of certifying
Marks based solely on the voting machine count improper.5 2
The Third Circuit remanded the decision and instructed the lower
court to seat Marks only if it could be shown "but for the wrongdoing"
Marks would have won the election by a plurality. 3 The appellate court
granted Judge Newcomer broad discretion since it did not require the
issue to be decided with "mathematical certainty. 5 4 The appellate court
also advised the lower court of alternative remedies such as calling a
special election or creating an opening in the second senatorial district so
that state entities would deal with the vacancy." Interestingly, the Third
Circuit never mentioned the appropriateness of the other remedies granted
by Newcomer.56
C. Reenter Newcomer
On remand, Judge Newcomer heard evidence for two weeks, listened
to analysis from three experts and dealt with twelve lawyers in the
courtroom.57 His opinion, issued on April 26, 1994, was remarkably
similar to his first. All of the same relief was granted-including the
unseating of Stinson and the naming of Marks as senator.5" According
to Newcomer this latest decision did not disenfranchise any absentee
voters as the experts' testimony met the standard of "reasonable degree
of scientific certainty." 59
IV. Marks v. Stinson as Public Law Litigation
Obviously, the Marks-Stinson senate race and the litigation that
followed present an elaborate and complex set of facts for any observer.
51. Id. at 886.
52. Id. at 887.
53. Marks, 19 F.3d at 887.
54. Id. at 888.
55. Id. at 889.
56. See generally id. (neglecting to comment upon many of the injunctive measures granted).
57. See Henry Goldman, Bickering Mars Trial on Vote Fraud-2 People Testified in the 2d
District Case-12 Lawyers Argued, PHILA. INQ., Mar. 30, 1994, at BI (discussing Judge Newcomer's
agitation with the twelve attorneys involved in the case); see also Henry Goldman, US. Trial Judge
in Vote Case Decries Lawyers'Fees-Newcomer Scolded Lawyers for Prolonging the Second District
Case, PHILA. INQ., Apr. 8, 1994, at AI (reporting that Judge Newcomer believed the two weeks of
trial could have been accomplished in just a few days had it not been for the attorneys' behaviors).
58. Compare Marks, 1994 WL 146113 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26,1994) with Marks, 1994 WL 47710
(E. D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1994).
59. Marks, 1994 WL 146113, at *29.
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But, amidst all of the confusion, the federal judges in this scenario took
some unusual steps. Most would agree, after reading through the facts
presented above, that the steps taken are not those Americans associate
with scales of justice. In fact, many would assert the federal judges
behaved quite out of the ordinary.
Professor Abram Chayes, in a 1976 Harvard Law Review article,
offered insight into such federal judicial behaviors.6° In his article,
Chayes described a transformation in the role of the federal court
judge.6' Notions of removed neutrality, he contended, were fast
becoming a thing of the past-judges were now active participants in the
litigation. 62  He explained that the actual nature of the disputes was
shifting as well.63 Private party disagreements were being replaced by
those involving public policy determinations. 64  He described this
modem movement as the public law litigation model.65
Traditional litigation, according to Chayes (1) was bi-polar in nature
(i.e. a contest between two competing interests); (2) was compensatory
and retrospective; (3) involved a remedy that clearly fit and logically
followed the situation at hand; (4) had an effect only on the parties
involved in the suit; and (5) was party initiated and party controlled.66
This he contrasted with public law litigation which involves: (1)
amorphous party structures; (2) future relief that is more equitable than
compensatory in nature; (3) increasingly credible factfinding procedures;
and (4) resolution in the form of a deliberately fashioned decree.67
Thus, as per the Chayes model, the behavior of the federal judiciary
in the Marks case was not so unusual. Chayes would explain this
litigation as right on target, given the climate of the modem court. If we
examine the facts of Marks v. Stinson under Chayes' model we find it
does fit the bill.
A. Party Structure
Marks' initial attempts to obtain judicial relief in the state system
stretched far beyond a mere request for compensation from an opponent.
The equitable relief demanded, impounding the absentee ballots, intimated
60. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 29 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1284.
63. Id.
64. Chayes, supra note 60, at 1284.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1285-88.
67. Id. at 1288-1304.
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profound effects upon other persons not even party to the suit. Further,
the plaintiffs' claims were directed not only at Stinson but the Board of
Elections as well.
The party composition became more complex as the case moved
through the state and federal courts. For instance, a group of Hispanic
voters who felt their rights had been violated joined Marks in the suit.6"
A non-partisan, non-profit "watchdog" organization of citizens called the
"Committee of Seventy" became involved at the state court level and later
filed an amicus brief with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 9
Although this organization essentially shared the plaintiffs' concerns that
Stinson's confirmation was invalid, they were in favor of calling another
special election.70
In addition, the defendants' cast of characters by the time the suit
was decided on remand included William Stinson, the William Stinson
Campaign, the Philadelphia County Board of Elections and various Doe
and Roe defendants. A motion to intervene was granted to another group
of voters who claimed the absentee ballots they cast were proper and
deserved to be counted."' Though the court never clearly delineated this
latter group along party lines, these voters seemed to be aligned with the
defendants since they wanted Judge Newcomer to reconsider his decision
to invalidate their legally cast ballots.72
Such an amorphous group of actual parties is inapposite with the
traditional model of "two unitary interests, diametrically opposed."73
Under Chayes' model the broad range of interests and the number of
groups involved was conducive to Judge Newcomer's exercise of broad
authority.
B. Equitable Relief
Judge Newcomer explained on remand that a hearing on damages
was pending, but this was not the focal point of his decision.74 The
appellate court did not discuss how or what compensation the district
68. Marks, 1994 WL 37722 (E.D. Pa Feb. 7, 1994) (discussing the Latino voters' standing to
bring suit in federal court). See supra note 40.
69. See Brief of Amicus Curiae-The Committee of Seventy, Marks v. Stinson, Nos. 94-1247
& 94-1248, 1994 WL 80795 (3rd Cir. Mar. 16, 1994) (explaining and justifying the non-profit's
involvement in the case).
70. Id. at 3.
71. Marks, 1994 WL 146113, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994).
72. Id.
73. Chayes, supra note 60, at 1282.
74. Marks, 1994 WL 146113, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994).
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court should award,75 but instructed the district court to "exercise its
own discretion in light of the circumstances."76 Notions of equity and
fairness were indeed the focus of both the Third Circuit and district court
opinions.
On remand, Judge Newcomer, discussed the importance of a
decision that would insure "free and fair elections."77 But, Newcomer
must have recognized how extraordinary the relief he granted was as he
explained "[f]ederal courts in shaping equity decrees are 'vested with
broad discretionary powers."'78
The unseating of Stinson, the seating of Marks and the various
injunctions granted against the Board of Elections were all forms of
equitable relief which insured that a continuing judgment was created
which would need enforcement or clarifications in the future. As
explained by Chayes, equitable relief in public law cases "is not a
terminal compensatory transfer, but an effort to devise a program to
contain future consequences in a way that accommodates the range of
interests involved. 79
C. Factfinding Methodology
Given the number of parties and the plethora of competing interests,
there was certainly more than one version of "the story" to be told to the
federal courts. In addition, the factual complexity of the situation insured
that a casual assessment of the case would not be fair or appropriate.
Chayes suggested that such is often the case in public law
litigation.8" These situations, he contended, lend themselves to a more
active role for the trial judge in "shaping, organizing and facilitating the
litigation."'', And, although the litigants usually produce the facts, the
many complexities of such cases do not permit the parties in public law
litigation to exercise complete autonomy over presentation of the case. 2
The appellate court recognized that the situation in Marks v. Stinson
called for more than the average presentation of evidence. They
instructed the district court to demonstrate that their result would be
75. See generally Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1994).
76. Id. at 890.
77. Marks, 1994 WL 146113, at *34 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964)).
78. Id. at *34 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973)).
79. Chayes, supra note 60, at 1294.
80. See id. at 1298 (explaining that "sheer volume of factual material" in the modem federal
court case may cause the judge to become more active in the litigation).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1297.
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"worthy of the confidence of the electorate.""3 The Third Circuit further
explained that courts have been able to meet this standard with the aid of
expert testimony.
84
In compliance with this advice, the district court on remand not only
heard from experts supplied by Marks and the intervenors, but heard
testimony by an "independent expert" appointed by Judge Newcomer
himself 85 This was the first time in Newcomer's twenty-two years as a
judge that he had taken such a step. 6 The court-appointed expert was
an economics professor from Princeton University, selected by Newcomer
because he "was not aware that any experts were going to testify" and
"[i]n light of the Third Circuit's mandate ... wanted to insure that the
opinions of at least one expert were going to be offered." '
All of the experts utilized complex statistical analysis to determine
if Marks would have won the election but for the wrongdoing of
Stinson. ' Although the appointed expert used a somewhat different
method of analysis than the other experts, his opinion was "considered
equally with the others."8 9  From the intricate statistical explanations,
Judge Newcomer decided that the experts as a group proved Marks would
have won the election by a plurality if the fraud had not occurred.9 °
The district court's active soliciting of its own specialist is consistent
with Chayes' belief that the modem federal court needs to utilize a
"visibly reliable and credible procedure for establishing and evaluating
the fact elements in the litigation."'"
D. Deliberately Fashioned Decree
The Marks litigation, again consistent with Chayes' assertions,
concluded with a unique and "deliberately fashioned" decree.92 Though
Chayes suggested that the decree is often the result of an agreement
reached between the parties, he explained that "the parties may fail to
83. Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 889 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994).
84. Id.
85. Marks, 1994 WL 146113, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994).
86. Henry Goldman, Second District Voting Trial Ends Amid Uncertainty Over Numbers, PHILA.
INQ., Apr. 9, 1994 at BI.
87. Marks, 1994 WL 146113, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994).
88. See id. at *22-29 (explaining the methodology and types of analysis utilized by the experts
witnesses).
89. Id. at *27.
90. Id. at *29.
91. Chayes, supra note 60, at 1297.
92. Id. at 1298.
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agree."93 In this scenario, as in the case at hand, the judge must take a
much more active role.94
Judge Newcomer's final decree listed several powerful injunctive
orders. These injunctions not only prevented future actions from
happening, but they carried with them "affirmative" implications of
legislative acts. For instance, the Board of Elections was "enjoined from
delivering or returning such records [official absentee ballot materials] to
any agent or other representative of any political party or candidate." 95
Judge Newcomer stated that such relief was appropriate pursuant to
section 3146.9 of Pennsylvania's election law.96 This section of law,
though, deals only with the Board's requirement to maintain such
information for public records.97 The law in no way makes any mention
of the prohibition read in by Judge Newcomer.98
Thus, one can easily say that the Marks v. Stinson litigation
exemplifies the modern federal court as described by Chayes. But, even
using Chayes' model as a framework within which to examine the Marks
v. Stinson case, we are still left feeling that the actions of the federal
judiciary were quite extraordinary. Even if we accept Chayes'
proposition that this is the way things really are within the federal courts,
there are still important questions raised by the federal courts' activities
in this case.
Unfortunately, analogizing to the public law model does not
adequately satiate the concerns one has regarding the federal courts'
behavior in the Marks litigation. Chayes listed some of the potential
problems with this model but, with little empirical support, essentially
deemed it a good system. 99 For those questioning the implications of
this new model, Chayes warned that "we have invested excessive time
and energy in the efforts to define . . what the precise scope of judicial
activity ought to be."'' °  He instructed onlookers to attain a "more
systematic professional understanding of what is being done."''
93. Id. at 1299.
94. See id. at 1299-1300 (explaining that if parties do not reach an agreement the judge may
need to become a "personal participant" in the lawsuit).
95. Marks, 1994 WL 146113, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1994).
96. Id.; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3146.9 (1994).
97. See id. (stating that absentee ballots information is "declared to be public records and shall
be safely kept for a period of two years" by the boards of elections in Pennsylvania).
98. See generally id.
99. See Chayes, supra note 60, at 1302-1316 (describing some of the promises and problems
of the public law litigation model, though urging a "hospitable reception for the developments" in
the courts).
100. Id. at 1307.
101. Id. at 1313.
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Chayes basically implored his reader not to question the actions of the
federal courts.
The author of this paper, however, takes a different position. If a
decision raises questions in our minds, we must actively address those
questions. Thus, even defining Marks as public law litigation, we should
wonder whether the federal judiciary was correct in adjudicating an
essentially state election law dispute that was already being handled at the
state level. Despite Chayes' admonition, we should question the
propriety of the district court's remedies. As Chayes wisely recognized,
"the returns are not all in" on the public law model." 2 As such, the
rest of this paper will focus on the returns as seen in Marks v. Stinson in
light of the two questions raised above.
V. Judging the Third Circuit: Propriety of Federal Intervention
While the law generally provides for the federal courts to hear cases
involving federal questions and the Voting Rights Act permits a party
aggrieved by discrimination to proceed to federal court before exhausting
all state remedies,0 3 pragmatic notions of full faith and credit require
federal courts to heed the decisions that have been made during a state's
adjudicative processes.0 4 This must be the case even if states do not
make the best decisions.
In addition, while it is true Baker v. Carr"°5 and its progeny
opened the door for federal judicial review of discriminatory state
election laws, unbridled election law intervention runs counter to the idea
that federal courts should refrain from hearing constitutional challenges
when regarded an improper intrusion on the right of a state to enforce its
own laws in its own courts. 6 Limited intervention has certainly been
the policy regarding "garden variety" election disputes, such as the one
at hand, which really do not go beyond a question of how election ballots
should be marked and counted. 7
102. Id. at 1309.
103. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1994); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1971(d) (West 1994).
104. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 731-36 (1994) (explaining that
federal courts should give full faith and credit to state court decisions).
105. See Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186 (1966) (holding that a federal court can review a
discriminatory state legislative apportionment scheme).
106. WRIGHT, supra note _ at 340.
107. See Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1985) (making a distinction between
"garden variety" election law disputes and those which are constitutionally cognizable); see also Roe
v. Alabama, 1995 WL 2398 at *3 (1 1th Cir. Jan 4, 1995) (stating "[g]enerally, federal courts do not
involve themselves in 'garden variety' election disputes").
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The Stinson camp questioned the propriety of the federal court's
involvement in this state level election law dispute. They protested
strongly against the federal court's jurisdiction over Marks' cause of
action.'08 Despite Marks' amended complaint alleging violations raising
proper federal questions, Stinson articulated that lack of standing as well
as various abstention doctrines should prevent the federal court from
hearing the case. 1° 9 One of the major issues in the district court
became the Younger abstention doctrine."'
The Younger abstention doctrine,"' although initially a criminal
law theory, has been applied in civil cases as well." 2  The central
message of Younger is that a federal court should not interfere with
pending state court proceedings." 3 The doctrine is now embodied in
a three part test. In order for a party to challenge federal court
jurisdiction, that party must show (1) that there are ongoing state
proceedings involving the would be federal plaintiffs that are judicial in
nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and
(3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the
federal claims." 4  Under this doctrine, the district court found the
federal system to be an appropriate forum for Marks." 5 Specifically,
the district court stated that under the third prong the state did not
provide an adequate forum in which Marks could raise federal
claims. 6 Even if the state forum was adequate, the court explained,
given the irreparable harm Marks and the voters could suffer from not
being heard in a timely fashion, the federal court had a duty to the public
to hear the case." 7
The Third Circuit's appellate assessment of the Younger abstention
doctrine was considerably different. The court stated it did not believe
108. See Marks v. Stinson, No. CIV.A. 93-6157, 1994 WL 37722 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 1994)
(assessing defendants' claims that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear Marks' complaint).
109. Id. at*1.
110. Id. at *2-3.
111. The Younger abstention doctrine was created in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
(holding that a federal court acted improperly by enjoining a state court from prosecuting an
individual under the state's criminal syndicalism act).
112. See Middlesex Co. Ethics Comm. v. Garden Stat Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)
(expanding the scope of Younger abstention doctrine to include civil disputes); see also PETER W.
Low & JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL STATE RELATIONS
1233-43 (1989) (discussing Younger's application to civil cases in the federal courts).
113. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431.
114. Id. at 432.
115. Marks, 1994 WL 37722, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa Feb. 7, 1994).
116. Id.
117. Id. at *3.
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the state proceedings to be conducted in bad faith."' And, while the
appellate court recognized the utility of the three part test, they explained
it did not apply to the case at hand." 9 The court opined that "where
federal proceedings parallel but do not interfere with the state
proceedings, the principles of comity underlying Younger abstention are
not implicated."'"2
The Third Circuit, while it expressed that the federal and state
proceedings were "parallel," never really defined the term or explained
what it meant. The appellate court reasoned that plaintiffs fighting the
war on both the federal and state front was permissible because "the relief
they have sought and received does not in any way interfere with the
judicial process of the state."'' The Third Circuit added that "[t]his is
not a case in which the federal plaintiffs are seeking relief which will in
any way impair the ability of the state courts of Pennsylvania to
adjudicate anything currently before them."'22
Such statements by the court are misleading at best. The Third
Circuit seemed to be trying to step lightly on state territory. But their
vague rationale obfuscated notions of issue and claim preclusion. This
is particularly true since the Board of Elections had already rendered a
decision with regard to the issues involved.'
But, even if we are to assume there was not a final judgment on the
merits of the Marks group's claims, the Third Circuit's assessment of the
future of the litigation seems disingenuous. Though the appellate court
did concede that "parallel proceedings always involve a likelihood that a
final merits judgment will effectively terminate the other . .,,124 such
a statement is not a clear assessment of what actually would occur. Here
it would seem the "likelihood" was unavoidable.
While it may be argued that the different adjudicative proceedings
could continue to exist harmoniously, any final decision reached by the
federal court would have necessarily controlled the state supreme court
and prevented them from rendering their own decision on the same issues
and claims. 2 5 There would be no way for Judge Newcomer to seat
118. Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 882 n.5.
119. Id. at 884.
120. Id. at 882 (citing Gwynedd Properties v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1201
(3d. Cir. 1992)).
121. Id. at 885 (emphasis added).
122. Marks, 19 F.3d at 884 (emphasis added).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 885.
125. See ROBERT C. CASAD, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION (1969) (describing the ways in which
litigants can be barred or precluded from addressing issues and claims in a court once such matters
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Marks under federal law and for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
decide differently. 26
The Third Circuit's discussion of "parallel proceedings," therefore,
is deceptive, and is hardly a good example for the federal court to be
setting in the midst of claims of fraud. Essentially, the Third Circuit has
actively encouraged unhappy state litigants to disempower their own state
courts by shopping for a federal forum to solve local election law
disputes.
Interestingly, the Third Circuit applied the same "parallel" rationale
to the proceedings in the Pennsylvania Senate. Though reluctant to
consider the senate's appeal process as "judicial" in nature, they
announced that "certification of Marks would not preclude an election
contest in the senate, any more than the prior certification of Stinson
precluded one.""' The Court then immediately dropped a footnote
stating, "we do not mean to suggest that a federal court would be without
power to enjoin an election contest in the Senate upon finding a violation
of the Voting Rights Act of the Civil Rights Act, or that the Senate
would not be required to give full faith and credit to a final district court
judgment in this case. Those issues are not before us and we express no
opinion thereon."' 28
This treatment of the senate proceedings is problematic in two ways.
First, the Third Circuit offered the state senate no clear guidance as to
how it should deal with an inconsistent decision should one be reached.
Second, the appellate court created a frightening image of an omnipotent
federal court.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing analysis that the appellate court's
application of abstention and preclusion doctrines effectively deprived the
state system of any meaningful review of Marks' state claims. But
assuming that a federal court should have heard this dispute, how far
should they have gone in fashioning relief for the claimants?
VI. Judging the District Court: Propriety of Remedial Discretion
Recently, Chayes reexamined the scope of judicial activism in
relation to remedies.'29 He acknowledged that "the general tone of
scholarly, journalistic and political commentary has been increasingly
have been handled by a prior court).
126. See generally id.
127. Marks, 19 F.3d at 885.
128. Id. at 885 n.9.
129. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and The
Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982).
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skeptical of judicial efforts to ride herd on state and federal
bureaucracies."' 30 He further recognized "[t]o be sure, the purpose of the
decree is to rectify a course of conduct that has been found to abridge
rights asserted by plaintiffs . . . [c]ontrol of remedial discretion is
therefore an insistent problem in a public law system."''
After this realization, however, Chayes still did not draw a line in
the sand. Rather, he again warned of the "futility of trying to deal with
problems raised by public law litigation in terms derived from the classic
law model" and suggested that federal decisions should not be overly
scrutinized under a right-remedy analysis.'32 His main concern was that
the United States Supreme Court, when examining "remedial discretion,"
constructed an "effigy of the traditional lawsuit" which was incoherent
and diverted attention from other concerns that should be taken into
account.
33
Even if we accept Chayes' proposal that we should not impose strict,
traditional guidelines upon our federal judiciary, we as onlookers must
still be left feeling cheated by Judge Newcomer's decision. Newcomer's
single-handed "election" of Marks stirs emotions that stem from
something deeper than the esoteric notion of sufficient links between
rights and remedies. Rather, there is a strong, instinctive belief that the
relief granted by Judge Newcomer is destructive to our democratic ideals.
Assuming the federal court should have been hearing this case, the
District Court had a difficult task in deciding what to do once it removed
Stinson from office. But, of the options offered by the Third circuit -
to seat Marks, call a new election, or declare a vacancy and permit the
state to take care of the rest, Judge Newcomer chose the worst.
This is not to say that the Federal Court should not have ousted
Stinson, because clearly he was not the winner of the election. But, as
clear as this is, so too is the fact that Marks was not the winner. Despite
the numbers game played by Judge Newcomer, after review of the
experts' testimony there was no way to tell who won by a plurality of the
vote. Further, no matter how Judge Newcomer attempted to slice it,
promises of "one man-one vote" were not fulfilled in this election. Some
men and women's votes were simply not counted. As was pointed out
by Richard A. Sprague, the attorney for the defendant intervenors, "[o]ne
thing is crystal clear: There's not a person in the courtroom who can say
130. Id. at7.
131. Id. at 46.
132. Id. at 47-55.
133. Id. at 8.
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who would have won but for the fraud."' 34  It seems as though
Newcomer, on remand, merely lined up his dominoes in such a way that
it at least created the appearance of a well-founded opinion.
The selection of the expert from Harvard supports this inference.
After the Third Circuit instructed the district court to provide more
reliable evidence that Marks was chosen by a plurality of the vote,
Newcomer actively sought his own expert. It seems unrealistic that
Newcomer would have chosen someone he knew would prove him wrong
on remand. Instead, the judge selected an acquaintance-someone he met
at a statistics seminar.' 5 Hardly an insurance of neutrality.
Moreover, in Milliken v. Bradley,'36 the Supreme Court warned
that "[t]he Federal Court in devising a remedy must take into account the
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs,
consistent with the Constitution."' 37  By naming Marks as Senator,
Judge Newcomer usurped power specifically granted to the Pennsylvania
Lieutenant Governor pursuant to Pennsylvania election laws.'38 Though
the contested senate seat remained empty throughout the litigation,
Lieutenant Governor Singel was prevented from fulfilling his obligation
because technically there was no "vacancy."' 39 Judge Newcomer could
have bowed out gracefully and avoided the title of extreme activist by
opting to leave the seat open and permitting Lieutenant Governor Singel
to do his job. Even recent redistricting cases have recognized the
necessity of intervening only as much as is necessary and permitting state
governments to formulate their own remedies. 4°
Additionally, just because the Board of Elections and the Stinson
Campaign acted deceptively does not mean that the entire electorate is
incapable of making informed decisions. Newcomer's paternalistic
134. Henry Goldman, SecondDistrict Voting Trial Ends Amid Uncertainty Over Numbers, PHILA.
INQ., April 9, 1994, at BI.
135. Id.
136. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
137. Id. at 280-81.
138. The lieutenant governor must call a special election to fill any vacancy in the senate. See
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2778 (1994) (explaining how vacancies in the Pennsylvania Legislature
should be filled).
139. See Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 889 (3d Cir. 1994) (permitting the district court to
create an "interim period without representation" for the second senatorial district while the district
court made its decision). See also Russell E. Eshleman Jr. & Henry Goldman, Second District
Partisans Skirmish-Singel Asks a Court to Let Him Set A May 10 Election-Fumo Sues Singel For
Not Setting One-Marks Drops An Appeal, PHILA. INQ., Mar. 15, 1994 at Al (recounting the
confusion surrounding the interim "vacancy" in the senate and Lieutenant Governor Mark Singel's
concerns about calling a special election).
140. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Mehfoud, 702 F. Supp. 588, 596 (1988) (granting a state legislature
seventy-five days to create a remedial plan).
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decision prevented this from happening. The cost of prolonging the
process by calling a special election would have been outweighed by the
need to maintain the state's democratic structure. Further, had Newcomer
chosen to order a special election when the case was first before him, that
special election could have occurred sooner than the actual district court
decision.
The irony in all of this is that the Voting Rights Act was created to
ensure that all persons have the right to vote.' 4' However, in
attempting to remedy this election dispute, and perhaps in contravention
of the Voting Rights Act, 42 the court ensured that some votes were not
counted.
An 82 year old man who voted by absentee ballot in the special
election eloquently criticized Newcomer's initial decision. 43 He wrote:
I was always taught.., that I was one man in a democracy with one
vote, and that this vote counted no matter what. How then does a
challenge by Bruce Marks of some absentee votes disqualify my vote?
I am perplexed and confused over this.
Judge Newcomer . . . has violated the very principles of our
democracy, let alone our precious Constitution ... Could it be that
Judge Newcomer, an appointed Judge for life who answers to no one,
doesn't quite understand our democratic system because he is so far
removed from it? I think that is so.
Though Mr. Fitzpatrick's comments were directed at Newcomer's first
decision, they apply equally to the final decision as well.
VII. Conclusion
Marks v. Stinson is an interesting and complex case that raises a
multiplicity of issues relating to civil rights, election law, federal
supremacy, judicial discretion and basic notions of democracy. This
paper clearly leaves many a stone unturned. It is, however, a cursory
review of the litigation in light of Chayes' public law litigation model.
This paper, within the framework of Chayes' model, has attempted
to look more closely at some of the issues raised by current federal
judicial activism. Specifically, this paper addressed: (1) whether the
federal judiciary should have heard the Marks case even though it was
141. See e.g. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) (explaining the purpose
of the Voting Rights Act).
142. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(n) (West 1994) (stating that the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act should not be construed to adversely affect the right of any person to vote).
143. John J. Fitzpatrick, Editorial, P1ULA. INQ., Mar. 3, 1994 at A14.
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under consideration within the state's adjudicative systems; and(2) if we
believe that the federal court should have accepted the case, did the
federal judiciary go too far in formulating its equitable relief.
After this basic deconstruction of the Pennsylvania State Senate
special election and the Marks v. Stinson litigation, one should recognize
that there is not one clear winner or loser in this scenario. Despite the
federal courts' well-meaning intentions to intervene on behalf of
democracy and the public interest, such ambitions were not fulfilled. In
Marks v. Stinson the ideal of "one man-one vote" was taken to extremes
and the American dream of an empowered democratic nation was denied
a victory.
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